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The country needs more infrastructure investment to boost
jobs and growth. However, the government must pay due
attention to the scale and nature of the risk it accepts from
lenders
Mark Hellowell explains the virtues of new legislation that would promote infrastructure
projects by offering a government guarantee to lenders. However, he warns of
the negative implications the proposals will have; namely, the introduction of adverse
selection and moral hazard.
David Cameron will soon give details of  new legislation that will allow the government to
guarantee up to £40bn in inf rastructure projects and a f urther £10bn f or new housing.
Ministers are presenting the bill, which should be on the statute books by the end of
October, as a key part of  the administration’s latest
growth push.
In f act, the plan to establish a ‘UK Guarantees’ scheme to
accelerate investment in economic inf rastructure was
announced by the Chancellor George Osborne back in
July.
To qualif y f or a government guarantee, projects must be
‘nationally signif icant’ and ready to start in the 12 months
f ollowing a guarantee being conf irmed. They must also
have equity f inance in place – and sponsors will need to
persuade of f icials that they are unable to secure
f inancing f rom private sources without state support.
So what to make of  this plan? As the f ocus on ‘shovel ready’ projects indicates, the scheme is as much
about stimulating growth and employment as it is about addressing Britain’s need to update its energy,
transport and communications inf rastructure. Polit ically this matters. It shows that the coalit ion
government has f inally recognised the scale of  market f ailure in the f inancial markets and the central role
of  the state in addressing it.
Four years af ter the collapse of  Lehman Brothers, banks still f ace capital and liquidity constraints that
signif icantly undermine their ability to lend to inf rastructure projects. This is damaging the economy,
which needs higher spending by water, power and network industries to of f set the collapse in public
sector and corporate investment.
But if  the government has f inally recognised the need to act, it is not willing to increase its own
borrowing; at least that element of  its borrowing that shows up in the headline measures of  government
debt. Instead of  borrowing directly the idea is to use the coalit ion’s ‘hard won’ credit-worthiness to
guarantee payments to creditors and thus enable risk-averse banks, and perhaps institutional investors,
to lend to major projects.
The assumption is that because of  the ‘saf e haven’ status of  UK gilts, the government can take on
contingent liabilit ies without spooking the markets. By allowing banks to transf er project risk to the public
sector, lending will become saf er f or banks – and less expensive in terms of  their capital reserve
requirements. This should theref ore boost lending. In addition, enhancing credit in this way might enable
projects to be f inanced by bonds to be purchased by pension f unds and insurance companies.
The key to institutional investor involvement is to improve the rating of  bonds f rom BBB to ‘single A’, f or
which the market is deeper f or a variety of  reasons – partly the culture of  institutional investors and
partly because f orthcoming international regulations will limit the capacity of  such investors to buy
assets without an A-rating.
But there are risks here f or the government. Economists, who are (hopef ully) ref lecting on the origin of
the f inancial crisis in processes of  credit risk transf er by banks, might point to two key issues. First,
there is the problem of  adverse selection – the f act that projects seeking guarantees are precisely those
that have been unable to secure f inancing in the private sector. It theref ore seems reasonable to assume
these projects present a relatively unf avourable balance between risk and return.
Second, there is the problem of  moral hazard –  a guarantee will insure lenders against the costs of
def ault, which may then result in a lack of  due attention to the risks presented by projects or their
sponsors. A bank that has transf erred credit risk to the government in this way has less incentive to
carry out an appropriate level of  due diligence on a loan or monitor the perf ormance of  the borrower
af ter the loan is provided. Removing or weakening that due diligence f unction could generate f iscal and
economic risks f or the government unless the process is managed extremely assiduously — and there is
a risk that it may not be in the rush f or news stories with the word ‘growth’ in the headline.
Less problematic is the commitment to boost investment in housing developments. Sensibly it appears
the government wants to give housing associations a new role. This is something that the LSE’s Tim
Leunig has been advising them to do f or some time. Though the details of  the plans was not available at
the time of  writ ing, the idea seems to be that associations will issue bonds – again, underwritten by
government – to sell to institutional investors who want long-term assets at f ixed interest
rates. Housing associations would then contract with developers to build houses and f lats and sell or
rent them in the open market.
Of  the two elements of  the planned guarantees legislation, this looks like the less risky. As the private
rental market is buoyant, the revenue stream associated with the new properties should be relatively
stable, at least f or the f oreseeable f uture. However, development costs will still need to be well-managed
which implies the requirement f or associations to invest substantially in specialist human resources.
Britain remains in a deep recession of  uncertain duration. The government’s belated recognition of  the
state’s central role in the recovery is welcome. As public capital spending is reined in and big corporates
pull in their horns, the country undoubtedly needs more inf rastructure investment to boost jobs and
growth. Well-conceived projects can also be of  huge benef it f or economies in the long-run, especially in
an era of  rapid technological progress, climate change, urbanisation and growing congestion.
If  the housing plan can provide a stimulus while allowing more people to be housed decently, then that is
hugely desirable. Although, as the government scrabbles around f or an of f -balance sheet stimulus, it
must pay due attention to the scale and nature of  the risks it is accepting f rom lenders. As countries
such as Portugal have recently f ound, contingent liabilit ies can prove catastrophically expensive when
they crystalise.
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